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THE BELLWETHER SETTLEMENT
Adam S. Zimmerman*
This Article examines the use of bellwether mediation in mass litigation.
Bellwether mediations are different from “bellwether trials,” a practice
where parties choose a representative sample of cases for trial to determine
how to resolve a much larger number of similar cases. In bellwether
mediations, the parties instead rely on a representative sample of settlement
outcomes overseen by judges and court-appointed mediators.
The hope behind bellwether mediation is that different settlement
outcomes, not trials, will offer the parties crucial building blocks to forge a
comprehensive global resolution. In so doing, the process attempts to (1)
yield important information about claims, remedies, and strategies that
parties often would not share in preparation for a high-stakes trial; (2) avoid
outlier or clustering verdicts that threaten a global resolution for all the
claims; and (3) build trust among counsel in ways that do not usually occur
until much later in the litigation process.
The embrace of such “bellwether settlements” raises new questions about
the roles of the judge and jury in mass litigation. What function do courts
serve when large cases push judges outside their traditional roles as
adjudicators of adverse claims, supervisors of controlled fact-finding, and
interpreters of law? This Article argues that, as in other areas of aggregate
litigation, courts can play a vital “information-forcing” role in bellwether
settlement practice. Even in a system dominated by settlement, judges can
help parties set ground rules, open lines of communication, and, in the
process, make more reasoned trade-offs. In so doing, courts protect the
procedural, substantive, and rule-of-law values that aggregate settlements
may threaten.

* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. From 2001 to 2003, I was Deputy Special Master
to the U.S. September 11 Victim Compensation Fund. I owe deep thanks to the insightful
comments of Lynn Baker, Bob Bone, Beth Burch, Howard Erichson, Alexi Lahav, Judge Brian
Martinotti, Ellen Relkin, Jay Tidmarsh, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Judge Diane Welsh, and all
the participants of the colloquium entitled Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials
held at Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith
Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto
Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899
(2017). I also owe a special debt to my wife for her insightful edits and endless patience with
this project.
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INTRODUCTION
A curious thing happened in a Bergen County court in New Jersey.1 In a
case involving thousands of people with defective hip implants, the parties
reached a $1 billion global settlement in record time through an
unprecedented series of “bellwether settlements.”2
For years, courts have relied on “bellwether trials” to resolve large
numbers of similar lawsuits.3 In a bellwether trial, the parties select a small
group of cases for jury trial out of a larger pool of similar claims.4 Steering
committees of plaintiff and defense lawyers then use information gleaned
from those trials to resolve the remaining cases.5 Bellwether trials have been
used in many high-profile cases—most famously in the Vioxx litigation—
and, most recently, in General Motors’s litigation over its defective ignition

1. Cf. Stephen C. Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the
Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L. REV. 244, 244 (1977) (documenting novel “town hall”
court hearing techniques to resolve multiparty disputes and observing that a “curious thing is
happening in a courtroom in downtown Los Angeles”).
2. See Transcript of Global Settlement Program Hearing at 39, In re Stryker Rejuvenate
& ABG II Modular Hip Implant Litig., No. BER-L-936-13, MCL 296 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. Nov. 3, 2014) (“This really is unprecedented in the area of multi-county aggregate mass
litigation. It’s the first time I know of that anyone entered into the world of bellwether
mediations and bellwether settlements.”); Sindhu Sundar, $1B Stryker Deal Shows Path to
Trial-Free MDL Settlements, LAW360 (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/
593672/1b-stryker-deal-shows-path-to-trial-free-mdl-settlements
[https://perma.cc/8SK7QVXL].
3. See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:001898, MDL 1358(SAS), M21-88, 2007 WL 1791258, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2007)
(“[R]esolution of these issues often facilitates settlement of the remaining claims.”); Eldon E.
Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323 (2008);
Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576 (2008).
4. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.756 (FED. JUDICIAL CTR.
2004).
5. See infra Part I.
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switches.6 As multidistrict proceedings begin to take up a larger portion of
the federal docket,7 the use of bellwether trials will only grow.
But instead of bellwether trials, the Bergen County court organized a
system of bellwether mediations.8 In a bellwether mediations, no jury
decides the merits or value of the case. Rather, the parties—supervised by
the court—rely on a structured sample of mediated settlements involving
representative plaintiffs. The different settlement outcomes, much like a
series of bellwether trials, are intended to offer the parties crucial “building
blocks” of information to globally resolve the remaining cases.9
Judge Brian R. Martinotti, the New Jersey state court judge designated to
handle the selected cases, was incredibly successful.10 Following forty
representative mediations, the parties resolved more than 2,000 lawsuits in
New Jersey state court and a similar number of pending lawsuits in a parallel
federal multidistrict litigation in Minnesota—all in one fell swoop.11 In the
end, over 95 percent of the potential plaintiffs accepted settlement offers
based on the global agreement.12
The court’s complete embrace of a bellwether settlement scheme raises
new questions for juries and judges. What do bellwether settlements mean
when the procedures and outcomes lack any connection with a jury trial? By
dispensing with the jury entirely, the parties arguably give up procedures that
are thought to (1) encourage vigorous advocacy before neutral fact-finders,13
(2) promote fidelity to law by ensuring that settlements correspond to the

6. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 459 (E.D. La. 2006); Bill Vlasic,
G.M. Settles Ignition-Switch Case Planned as Bellwether Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2016, at
B4.
7. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 67, 72 (2017) (noting that “from 2002 to 2015, multidistrict proceedings leapt from
sixteen to thirty-nine percent of the federal courts’ entire civil caseload”).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See Transcript of Global Settlement Program Hearing, supra note 2, at 17 (stating
“from those individual pieces of mediation where we would agree on certain evaluations, that
helped form building blocks” to global settlement).
10. Judge Martinotti was appointed to serve as a federal district court judge in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey on July 11, 2016. See Biographical Directory of
Federal Judges:
Martinotti, Brian R., FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/
nGetInfo?jid=3608&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/V857-NVCH].
11. See infra Part I.
12. See Jeannie O’Sullivan, Stryker Adds Patients to $1B Hip Implant Settlement, LAW360
(Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/874540/stryker-adds-patients-to-1b-hipimplant-settlement [perma.cc/YMG9-AYHC]. On December 19, 2016, Stryker announced an
agreement to compensate more plaintiffs who had undergone hip replacement surgery under
similar settlement terms. See Gordon Gibb, A Tale of Two Billion-Dollar Settlements,
LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/
articles/defective-hip-implants/hip-replacement-implant-failure-defective-5-22019.html
[perma.cc/RNN7-U3EC].
13. Cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997) (“Class counsel
confined to settlement negotiations could not use the threat of litigation to press for a better
offer and the court would face a bargain proffered for its approval without benefit of
adversarial investigation.” (citations omitted)).
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merits of the dispute,14 and (3) provide a democratic bulwark against
unelected judges who may harbor biases about what makes for a fair
outcome.15 Nevertheless, the process can benefit parties in other ways.
Among other things, they help counsel understand how beneficiaries of a
global settlement value different outcomes, while building trust among
diverse law firms in high-stakes litigation. Moreover, they help avoid lotterylike verdicts, which bear little relationship to case values and do not shed
light about how to fairly resolve thousands of other similar cases.16
But bellwether settlements raise bigger questions about the role public
courts should play in the overwhelming number of cases resolved through
private settlement practice. Judges are traditionally thought to perform three
important functions in the civil justice system: (1) hear adverse claims, (2)
supervise controlled fact-finding, and (3) interpret law.17 But what is left for
judges to do when big cases push them outside their traditional role as
adjudicators?
Bellwether settlements represent one way that some judges have taken on
an important “information-forcing” role in aggregate litigation.18 That is, in
mass settlements, judges can influence the quality of settlement negotiations
by regulating the ways that parties create, record, and share information.19 In
much the same way that Stephen Yeazell once called for a “NASDAQ for
lawsuits,”20 Judge Martinotti’s bellwether mediations in the end produced a
judicially supervised settlement exchange—one designed to help the parties
set ground rules, open the lines of communication between far-flung law
14. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives and
Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691, 697 (2006) (stating
bellwether trials “offer an accurate picture of how different juries would view different cases
across the spectrum of weak and strong cases that are aggregated”).
15. Cf. Lahav, supra note 3, at 578 (bellwether trials permit juries to have a voice in mass
litigation by promoting “a type of ‘group typical’ justice that is at once participatory and
collective”).
16. See Alvin K. Hellerstein, Managerial Judging: The 9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 127, 161–63 (2012) (stating bellwether trials do not provide “sufficient
information to effect a wholesale global settlement”); Brian R. Martinotti, Complex Litigation
in New Jersey and Federal Courts: An Overview of the Current State of Affairs and a Glimpse
of What Lies Ahead, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 561, 575 (2012) (“[I]f the parties and counsel are in
the midst of successful settlement discussions, a bellwether trial that results in a verdict outside
the range of settlement—i.e., an outlier—may empower a party to go forth with the litigation
and cause negotiations to break down.”).
17. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 72–76 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing “dispute resolution” and “law
declaration” models of the federal courts); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:
The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365–71 (1973).
18. See Andrew Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge
in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2828461 [https://perma.cc/BQW4-7B7V]; David M. Jaros &
Adam S. Zimmerman, Judging Aggregate Settlement, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897217 [https://perma.cc/
3FBL-ZFVC].
19. See infra Part I.
20. Stephen C. Yeazell, Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Lawsuits?, in
CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 143 (Joseph W.
Doherty et al. eds., 2012); see also infra Part II.C.
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firms, and in the process, make more reasoned trade-offs in pursuit of a global
settlement.
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I provides a case study of a
bellwether settlement approach to resolving mass disputes, relying on
transcripts and interviews with lawyers and mediators involved in In re
Stryker Rejuvenate & ABG II Modular Hip Implant Litigation.21 As
discussed below, the bellwether mediation process in those cases took place
in two stages.22 First, the parties and court selected a representative sample
of cases based on the parties’ age, injury, surgeries, and postoperative
recovery. A wide variety of plaintiffs and their lawyers participated directly
in over forty separate, individual, and confidential mediations. Second, based
on the success of those mediated outcomes, the court then appointed a
mediator to commence a new phase of global settlement talks. Anonymous
data from the individual mediations were shared with a negotiating
committee, which in turn relied on each individual settlement to establish
benchmarks and variables for determining payouts to the broader group.
Part I also considers the kinds of cases most likely to benefit from a
bellwether settlement process. After reaching the global settlement,
participating lawyers took care to emphasize that bellwether mediations are
not for everyone.23 But bellwether settlements may provide an effective
option in future cases where (1) parties are open to settlement, (2) judges and
parties can coordinate and transparently share settlement information in state
and federal court, and (3) diverse groups of law firms and plaintiffs actively
participate in the mediation process.
Part II explores the broader theoretical questions raised by bellwether
settlements. First, the turn to bellwether mediation in Stryker reflects a
general unease with bellwether trials.24 Because of the substantial risk and
expense associated with “bet-the-company litigation,” parties rarely conduct
more than a handful of bellwether trials and get very mixed results when they
do. Second, the success of a bellwether mediation process illustrates how
court-supervised “repeat play” may help resolve large numbers of common
cases.25 Third, even as bellwether mediations challenge the traditional
judicial role, courts can remain critical players in policing the integrity of
judicial proceedings increasingly dominated by settlement.26

21. No. BER-L-936-13, MCL 296 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 3, 2014). I note that I
did not obtain interviews with the defense attorneys involved in the Stryker litigation.
22. See infra Part I.
23. See Sundar, supra note 2.
24. See infra Part II.
25. Frank E.A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution
Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 1, 28 (2006) (stating negotiators can improve outcomes and build trust through “partial
reciprocal disclosures over time” and the involvement of “a third party neutral to facilitate the
exchange of information”).
26. See Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 530 (1824) (“[I]t is extremely desirable that the
respectability of the bar should be maintained, and that its harmony with the bench should be
preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to reside in the
Court.”); see also D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG
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I. CASE STUDY OF A BELLWETHER SETTLEMENT
This part describes the bellwether mediation process used in the Stryker
litigation, as well as the kinds of cases that may benefit from it in the future.
A. The Stryker Litigation
In June 2012, one of the largest medical device companies in the world,
Stryker Orthopedics, voluntarily recalled two of its artificial hip implants.27
When Stryker first unveiled the devices in 2009, it had high hopes. Hip
implants have a “neck” that connects to the hip or femur; however, Stryker’s
“modular” hip had an extra joint so doctors could easily adjust it to each
patient.28 The device, coated with strong metal alloys, promised to be
durable and flexible—critical features of a device designed to serve an aging
population seeking greater mobility.29
Within a few years, however, Stryker discovered that the titanium and
cobalt alloys in the implant could corrode, damaging surrounding tissue,
muscle, and bone.30 Regulators in the United States and Great Britain began
to warn consumers about the growing health problem associated with metal
hip implants.31 In the summer of 2012, Stryker recalled the devices and
offered blood testing, MRIs, medical examinations, and, if necessary,
payment for “revision” surgery to replace the device for uninsured patients.32
Thousands of its customers sued.33
The kinds of people who need hip implants vary, but they often include
very elderly patients, as well as young working patients suffering from
obesity, sports ailments, or other traumatic injuries. Some suffered allergic
reactions, inflammation, or damage to the tissue and muscle groups around
the hips and thighs; others required multiple surgeries to replace the implants,
sometimes on both hips. And surgery itself carried different risks for
different patients. Some operations went smoothly, while others required

2D 453, 463 (2007) (describing the critical role judges play in protecting “the integrity of the
process”).
27. See Greg Ryan, Stryker Recall Undercuts Key Defense for Implant Makers, LAW360
(July 10, 2012), http://www.law360.com/articles/358385 [https://perma.cc/NY6N-PZMV];
Press Release, FDA, Stryker Initiates Voluntary Product Recall of Modular-Neck Stems:
Action Specific to Rejuvenate and ABG II Modular-Neck Stems (July 6, 2012),
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/ucm311043.htm [https://perma.cc/N3CS-DATB].
28. See id.
29. See Barnaby J. Feder, A Parts Supplier to an Aging Population, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 26, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/26/business/a-parts-supplier-to-an-agingpopulation.html (“[A]utomakers can only dream of the kind of growth prospects that Stryker
has. Ever-increasing numbers of aging baby boomers will be driving demand for Stryker’s
hips, knees and spinal implants—and the tools to install them—for years to come.”)
[https://perma.cc/K8W7-LPBU].
30. See Barry Meier, Stryker Settles Suits by Hip Implant Patients for $1 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2014, at B9.
31. See Barry Meier, Remedy Is Elusive as Metallic Hips Fail at a Fast Rate, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2011, at A1; Natasha Singer, Hip Implants Are Recalled by J.&J. Unit, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2010, at B1.
32. See Meier, supra note 30.
33. See id.
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patients to suffer through long, painful recoveries and rehabilitation, with
complications including infection, dislocation, pulmonary embolism, stroke,
and the need for other additional surgeries.34
The litigation that followed presented all the difficulties of a large mass
tort case: a large group of varied, severe personal injury claims involving the
same product that, if individually tried, could produce endless litigation.35
Accordingly, the parties moved to consolidate cases in state and federal court.
More than 2,000 state cases were consolidated before Judge Brian Martinotti
in multicounty litigation (MCL) in Bergen County, New Jersey, where
Stryker operates.36 A similar number of cases were eventually consolidated
in federal district court in a multidistrict litigation (MDL) before Judge
Donovan Frank in Minnesota.37
B. The Bellwether Settlement Process
The parties’ successful bellwether settlement negotiations, as set forth
below, took place in two discrete phases. In the first phase, the parties
confidentially mediated over forty settlements in federal and state court. In
the second phase, negotiating committees relied on anonymous information
from those mediations as important “building blocks” to forge a global
settlement.
1. Phase I: Individual Mediations
After consolidating the cases, the courts issued case management orders to
help organize them, much like many other mass torts. Judge Martinotti, in
the New Jersey MCL, appointed lawyers to lead a steering committee
charged with coordinating discovery, motion practice, and, if needed, trials.38
Judge Frank of the Minnesota MDL similarly met with the parties to lay out
a schedule for the federal litigation.
Early in the discovery process, however, Judge Martinotti proposed
something different. He recommended that the parties consider two
bellwether procedures.39 The first, like most others, anticipated that a series
of bellwether trials would commence in three years, beginning in June 2015.
34. Telephone Interview with Ellen Relkin, Plaintiffs’ Lead Counsel, Weitz & Luxenberg
(Sept. 9, 2016).
35. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT, at vii–xii
(2008) (defining mass torts); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION 4–10 (1995).
36. Civil Action Case Management Order #1, In re Stryker Rejuvenate & ABG II Hip
Implant Litig., No. BER-L-936-13, MCL 296 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 20, 2013).
37. See Greg Ryan, Suits over 2 Stryker Hip Implants Combined into Minn. MDL, LAW360
(June 13, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/449919 [https://perma.cc/SN6P-V6R4].
Initially, the federal multidistrict litigation included approximately 1,000 cases. See Telephone
Interview with Ellen Relkin, supra note 34. The parties and the federal mediators, however,
reported that by the time the case settled in November 2014, the federal multidistrict litigation
had approximately the same number of cases as those proceeding in the New Jersey MCL. See
id.
38. See Civil Action Case Management Order #1, supra note 36.
39. See Initial Mediation Consent Order, In re Stryker Rejuvenate & ABG II Modular Hip
Stem Litig., No. BER-L-936-13, MCL 296 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 2, 2013).
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In the second procedure, however, the parties would instead prepare for a set
of representative mediations, with the hope that the outcomes would help the
parties enter global settlement talks with more information and trust. The
attorneys were skeptical but ultimately agreed to both procedures.40
The lead-up to mediation still required that the parties conduct some
limited discovery, which the court organized into two phases. First, plaintiffs
had to produce information about the kind of hip replacements they received
and the year they were implanted.41 Because each hip replacement came with
a bar code, it was relatively straightforward to determine whether plaintiffs
were pursuing the same claims against the correct defendant and to screen
out those who alleged a different defect. Second, lawyers had to disclose
basic information about each plaintiff, including (1) their ages, (2) the model
number of each hip, (3) the nature of the surgery required to replace the hip
(or both hips), (4) whether the patient required a second surgery or “rerevision,” as well as (5) any complications arising from the surgery, including
fractures, dislocations, or infections.42 Each disclosure was also shared with
the leaders of each steering committee, coded, and tracked in an electronic
database.
Judge Martinotti appointed Judge Diane Welsh (a former magistrate judge)
and retired Judge C. Judson Hamlin (a former mass tort judge from
Middlesex County, New Jersey) to conduct individual mediations.43 In
coordination with Judge Martinotti, Judge Frank appointed Judge Art
Boyland (a former chief magistrate judge) to mediate cases in the federal
multidistrict litigation in Minnesota.44 In the first early sessions, the
plaintiffs appointed a negotiating team member to present their views about
common features of the litigation—like the legal basis for liability and
general scientific evidence about how defective hip implants may impact the
body.45
Originally, the negotiating subcommittee from each side chose two
representative cases and Judge Martinotti chose six, for a total of ten
mediations.46 Representative mediations attempted to cover the range of (1)
injuries (including inflammation, bilateral hip replacements, and fractured
bones); (2) ages (from thirty to eighty years of age); and (3) experiences with
medical procedures (multiple surgeries, complications, and infections).47

40. See Transcript of Global Settlement Program Hearing, supra note 2.
41. See Civil Action Case Management Order #3, In re Stryker Rejuvenate & ABG II Hip
Implant Litig., No. BER-L-936-13, MCL 296 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 19, 2013).
42. See id.
43. See Initial Mediation Consent Order, supra note 39. The court also appointed Judge
James D. Clyne and the Pilgrim Mediation Group. See id.
44. Telephone Interview with Diane M. Welsh, Mediator, JAMS (Sept. 9, 2016).
45. See Transcript of Global Settlement Program Hearing, supra note 2; Telephone
Interview with Ellen Relkin, supra note 34.
46. See Transcript of Global Settlement Program Hearing, supra note 2.
47. See Civil Action Case Management Order #6, In re Stryker Rejuvenate & ABG II Hip
Implant Litig., No. BER-L-936-13, MCL 296 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 26, 2013);
Experimental Bellwether Mediation Program, PLAINTIFFS’ STEERING COMMITTEE FOR
STRYKER
REJUVENATE
&
ABG
II
MODULAR
HIP
STEM
LITIG.,
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The attorneys appeared comfortable with the cases selected for mediation.48
Unlike other mass torts, where parties sometimes contest whether a plaintiff
suffered an injury or was even exposed to the defendant’s product,49 the
parties in this case could easily document plaintiffs’ injuries based on
objective criteria, such as barcodes for each hip, blood tests, and MRIs
demonstrating adverse tissue reactions and fractured or dislocated bones.50
The steering committees took steps to avoid the risk of gamesmanship.
The plaintiffs’ negotiation subcommittee educated lawyers from different
firms about the science and other comparable settlements for hip
replacements.51 Judge Martinotti also selected cases for mediation at
random, with counsels’ names redacted.52 These techniques reduced the
risks of what some scholars have called a “reverse auction”—the idea that
defense attorneys will select cases whose lawyers possess less experience in
the hopes of setting a “lower price” for particular injuries.53
Early in the mediation, Judge Welsh also attempted to ensure that each
case entering mediation was treated on its own merits. Individual plaintiffs
actively participated in each mediation process, making personal statements
and describing their experiences.54 The lawyers promised that the mediations
would not be “test runs.” That is, plaintiffs worked hard to ensure that the
individual settlements would be confidential and not contingent on
settlements reached in any other cases.55 If the plaintiff accepted the final
settlement offer, the settlement was binding and payment was made shortly
thereafter.
A variety of law firms represented plaintiffs in the individual mediations.56
The plaintiffs on the steering committee likely had an incentive to include
other lawyers in the serial mediations to ensure they had some “skin in the
game” and influence over their own client’s outcomes.57
The low cost of mediations, compared to trial, meant that the parties could
conduct many of them. The trial of complex medical device cases can exceed
$300,00058 due to difficult questions of general and specific causation—not
to mention expensive, hard-to-find expertise such as bioengineering,
http://rejuvenatehipsettlement.com/experimental-bellwether-mediation-program/ (last visited
Mar. 25, 2017) (describing the mediation process) [https://perma.cc/DV6E-MMSU].
48. See Transcript of Global Settlement Program Hearing, supra note 2; see also
Telephone Interview with Ellen Relkin, supra note 34.
49. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(finding insufficient evidence of exposure and specific causation); see also Parker v. Mobil
Oil, Corp. 857 N.E.2d 1114 (N.Y. 2006).
50. Telephone Interview with Ellen Relkin, supra note 34.
51. See id.
52. See Civil Action Case Management Order #6, supra note 47.
53. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370–73 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991).
54. See Transcript of Global Settlement Program Hearing, supra note 2.
55. Telephone Interview with Diane M. Welsh, Mediator, JAMS (Mar. 11, 2017).
56. Telephone Interview with Ellen Relkin, supra note 34.
57. Telephone Interview with Diane M. Welsh, supra note 44.
58. Telephone Interview with Ellen Relkin, supra note 34.
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orthopedic, regulatory, toxicological, or other medical experts.59 By
comparison, the parties conducted as many as two mediations a day for less
than $5,000 each.60 As a result, lawyers on both sides captured information
about a wide range of injuries and settlement values.
The participants also produced important information from individual
mediations.61 Judge Welsh found that parties did not hold back in each
session, providing sophisticated evidence, presentations, and arguments
ordinarily associated with litigation.
Parties produced “mediation
statements” in advance of the proceeding, as well as detailed presentations
about the nature and scope of damages. In mass litigation of this size, where
few cases go to trial, parties had good reason to treat individual mediations
as though they were “the whole ballgame.”62
Although the parties originally agreed to ten mediations, over time, more
attorneys sought to participate in the bellwether mediation process.63 In
about one year, twenty out of twenty-one cases were resolved through the
New Jersey mediation process.64 Combined with mediations in the federal
MDL process, the parties reached approximately forty settlements in
mediation.65 Each side found that the number of mediations gave the parties
“a really good handle on the basis for compensating particular injuries . . . to
understand the big picture.”66
2. Phase II: Global Settlement Talks
After the individual mediations concluded, Judge Martinotti and the parties
developed a process to discuss global settlement.67 Each negotiating member
collected and shared anonymous data about all the claimants who completed
mediation. Among other things, the parties included the ages, defects,
disabilities, surgeries, settlement amounts, and other remedies associated
with each case.
Organizing the discussions took some coordination between judges and
parties—particularly because they involved different attorneys working
across jurisdictions in federal and state court.68 In the course of the global
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Transcript of Global Settlement Program Hearing, supra note 2.
62. Telephone Interview with Diane M. Welsh, supra note 44.
63. Judge Martinotti also scheduled a third phase of individual mediations to be blindly
selected by the court.
64. See Civil Action Case Management Order #18, In re Stryker Rejuvenate & ABG II
Modular Hip Implant Litig., No. BER-L-936-13, MCL 296 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 4,
2014). The final case was resolved through postmediated settlement. See id.
65. Telephone Interview with Diane M. Welsh, supra note 55.
66. Telephone Interview with Ellen Relkin, supra note 34.
67. At first, Judge Martinotti appointed a confidential committee of four plaintiffs’
lawyers from the New Jersey Plaintiff Steering Committee to pursue confidential settlement
talks with Stryker. See Experimental Bellwether Mediation Program, supra note 47. Four
designated leaders of the MDL Leadership Committee were appointed by Judge Frank to join
with the New Jersey attorneys to complete the negotiations. See id.
68. The plaintiffs’ attorneys on the federal and state steering committees also had different
economic incentives in prosecuting the case. Federal multidistrict litigation often permits
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talks, the parties agreed to a $300,000 minimum base award for all plaintiffs
who met basic eligibility criteria.69 While it is difficult to assess how well
the mediations helped the parties formulate that base award, other hip implant
cases, involving similar lawyers, settled with comparable base awards.70
The mediators and parties, however, agreed that their experiences with
individual mediations helped them identify a range of factors—that would
have otherwise gone unnoticed—for adjusting the base award.71 Among
other things, the parties agreed to enhance awards for additional surgeries,
infections, or more complex surgeries that required doctors to cut damaged
bone to replace the hip. During the global talks, lawyers directly relied upon
the experiences individual plaintiffs shared in mediation.72 According to the
lead plaintiffs’ counsel: “We got a read on how both sides were valuing the
cases early on, began to identify some of the common situations that plaintiffs
experienced and an in-depth understanding of the various types of injuries
and procedures the various plaintiffs had gone through.”73
Accordingly, the bellwether mediations allowed the parties to “see beyond
the case file” and agree to a “well-tuned global settlement” that captured a
broad array of patients’ experiences.74
Global settlement negotiations may have moved swiftly for another
important reason: the parties agreed to an “uncapped settlement,” much like
recent settlements involving the BP oil spill and the NFL concussion
litigation.75 In an uncapped settlement, the defendant does not agree to a total
settlement award. Instead, the defendant agrees to an objective process for
resolving certain claims and, often, a separate facility to resolve them. Of
course, even in uncapped settlements, the parties have reason to vigorously
contest every aspect of the settlement process.76 But the possibility of an
members of the steering committee to receive a common benefit fee—a tax of sorts on all the
individual cases that benefit from their work on behalf of all the litigants. See, e.g., In re Oil
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No.
2179, 2011 WL 6817982 (E.D. La. Dec. 28, 2011); William B. Rubenstein, On What a
“Common Benefit Fee” Is, Is Not, and Should Be, 3 CLASS ACTION ATT’Y FEE DIG. 87, 88–90
(2009). New Jersey multicounty litigation does not provide for such awards. Accordingly,
the attorneys with the most individual cases, and the most to gain, had different incentives to
actively negotiate in the global settlement discussions.
69. See Master Settlement Agreement § 7.1, In re Stryker Rejuvenate & ABG II Modular
Hip Implant Litig., No. BER-L-936-13, MCL 296 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 3, 2014);
Transcript of Global Settlement Program Hearing, supra note 2.
70. See Barry Meier, J.&J. in Deal to Settle Hip Implant Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
2013, at B2 (noting that the typical payout equaled $250,000 before accounting for legal fees
and medical liens).
71. Telephone Interview with Ellen Relkin, supra note 34; Telephone Interview with
Diane M. Welsh, supra note 44.
72. See Transcript of Global Settlement Program Hearing, supra 2, at 17–19.
73. Id. at 18.
74. Telephone Interview with Ellen Relkin, supra note 34.
75. See In re NFL Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 433 (3d Cir. 2016); In
re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010,
910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 918 (E.D. La. 2012) (emphasizing “uncapped compensation” available
under the global settlement).
76. For example, BP sought to overturn its own multibillion dollar settlement complaining
that the elaborate claim process it agreed to overpaid certain damage claims. See Mica
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uncapped settlement may have reduced tensions among attorneys who
represented clients with different injuries.77
After reaching a global settlement, the parties retained a claim
administrator who determined compensation based on numerous factors.78
Eligible plaintiffs had to file a form that demonstrated they had specific tissue
damage due to the device, underwent surgery or a qualified revision surgery,
or needed revision surgery (but could not undergo surgery for medical
reasons). Awards were doubled for surgeries involving second hips.79 In the
end, 95 percent of the claimants participated.80 Those with unusual injuries
opted out but continue to mediate their claims today with the same mediators
and attorneys.81
3. Factors Contributing to Their Success
In the hearing to announce the final settlement, the parties, mediators, and
judges praised the bellwether settlement process for producing more relevant
information about settlement values, involving more plaintiffs in the
settlement process, and establishing more trust between the lawyers than in
high-stakes bellwether trials.82 But in subsequent conversations, they also
observed that a number of characteristics in the litigation helped ensure the
success of the bellwether settlement process. As described in more detail
below, bellwether settlements can be an effective tool when (1) parties are
open to settlement, (2) judges and parties can transparently share settlement
information in state and federal court, and (3) diverse groups of law firms
and plaintiffs actively participate in the mediation process.
First, the parties were open to the possibility of settlement. At least two
factors contributed to the parties’ willingness to consider the bellwether
settlement process. First, for purposes of the mediation, the parties did not
contest common questions of liability or scientific causation. The parties
may have been more open to settlement talks following trials and settlements
in other hip implant cases, like those involving Johnson & Johnson.83 In any
event, the parties and mediators observed that mediation may not be as

Rosenberg, Analysis: BP’s U.S. Gulf Oil Spill Settlement Challenges May Backfire, REUTERS
(Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bp-settlement-analysis-idUSBREA0
E16820140115 [perma.cc/FS3N-KHL3].
77. See Emily Field, Stryker to Pay $1B to Settle Hip Implant MDL Claims, LAW360 (Nov.
3, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/593053 [https://perma.cc/87DE-U29Y] (“What’s
unique is also an ability to get further payment for future complications. It’s a unique feature
of a mass tort settlement.”).
78. See Transcript of Global Settlement Program Hearing, supra note 2.
79. See Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 69, § 7.1.3.
80. See O’Sullivan, supra note 12.
81. Telephone Interview with Diane M. Welsh, supra note 44.
82. See Transcript of Global Settlement Program Hearing, supra note 2, at 17–19.
83. See Meier, supra note 70. At least two jury trials involving Johnson & Johnson’s
defective implants went to trial in 2013. See id. Johnson & Johnson’s device, which “ranks as
one of the most-flawed medical implants sold in recent decades,” produced two verdicts—an
$8 million dollar verdict in Los Angeles and a verdict in Chicago that rejected plaintiff’s
claims that Johnson & Johnson had inappropriately marketed its implant. Id.
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effective as a trial at resolving vigorously contested, general questions of
liability.84
To be sure, some forms of alternative dispute resolution can help parties
resolve such issues, as well. Repeat summary jury trials, jury focus groups,
and evaluative mediation have long been recommended to help attorneys
understand the strengths and weaknesses of common questions of liability.85
At a minimum, courts considering bellwether mediations should also
consider developing a separate plan to use such techniques or to conduct
bellwether trials, as Judge Martinotti did in this case.
The parties may have also been open to settlement talks because the
number of potential plaintiffs, and their injuries, was relatively easy to
estimate. Stryker sold the device for a discrete period of time, with traceable
bar codes, and to a population where the injury could be established through
objective criteria like blood tests, MRIs, and medical evaluations. These
features of the Stryker litigation took difficult questions off the table. Among
other things, the parties could better estimate how one mediated settlement
would play out over a well-defined universe of similar cases. Courts have
long said that statistical sampling best fits “inelastic” populations, when the
parties can accurately define the total universe of claims.86 The same may
be said for bellwether mediations used to lower stakes for individual
mediations and to lay a firm groundwork for global settlement talks.87
A second factor contributing to the success of the bellwether mediations
was transparency. Judges and parties were able to share basic settlement
information and coordinate across federal and state lines. This is no small
feat. In many cases, federal multidistrict litigation will not resolve parallel
state claims. When two coordinated proceedings take place in different
states, with different trial plans and different lawyers, the parties may be more
hesitant to share critical information. Here, Judge Martinotti and Judge Frank
overcame those obstacles and scheduled joint status and settlement
conferences. Over time, parties in both litigations shared information about
mediated settlements that often remain private.

84. Telephone Interview with Ellen Relkin, supra note 34; Telephone Interview with
Diane M. Welsh, supra note 44.
85. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.313 (FED. JUDICIAL CTR.
2004) (“[J]udges should consider conducting joint comprehensive settlement negotiations,
hearings, and alternative dispute resolution procedures to establish case values.”).
86. See, e.g., In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1997) (observing
that difficult-to-estimate or “elastic” populations are less amenable to statistical sampling).
87. For the same reason, the parties likely were more comfortable agreeing to an uncapped
settlement—which, in turn, reduced strategic trade-offs in the individual and global settlement
talks. Courts have approved such settlements, most recently in the NFL concussion and the
BP oil spill litigation, because they do not present the same conflicts between plaintiffs’
attorneys. See, e.g., In re NFL Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 433 (3d Cir.
2016) (“The Fund is uncapped and inflation-adjusted, protecting the interests of those who
worry about developing injuries in the future.”). When parties agree to a total cap on a
defendant’s payout for a large group of people, courts fear that plaintiffs’ attorneys negotiating
the settlement may find themselves accepting funds for some clients at the expense of others.
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620–21 (1997). But see Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, Armstrong v. NFL, 137 S. Ct. 607 (2016) (No. 16-413).
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Finally, diverse groups of law firms and plaintiffs participated in the
individual mediations that provided the building blocks for the global
settlement process. One of the main advantages of the bellwether settlement
process is that the low cost allows parties to conduct so many individual
mediations. But those additional mediations provide little comparative value
when they fail to involve enough law firms to feel confident in the outcome.
Here, the steering committee was willing to trust a diverse group of lawyers
and plaintiffs to participate in the bellwether mediation process.
II. BEYOND THE BELLWETHER SETTLEMENT
Experiments with bellwether settlements raise broader theoretical issues.
First, the parties’ embrace of bellwether settlements reflects larger concerns
about bellwether trials. Second, bellwether settlements suggest some value
to carefully supervised “repeat play” in the resolution of large numbers of
common cases. Third, these two observations suggest that, even though
bellwether settlements challenge the traditional judicial role, courts can still
protect the integrity of judicial proceedings increasingly dominated by
settlement.
A. Whither Bellwether Trials?
The parties’ turn to bellwether mediation in Stryker reflects a deeper
unease with bellwether trials. Judges originally adopted bellwether trials to
produce critical data for parties interested in brokering global settlements,
while still guaranteeing individual parties a right to their own representation
and trial.88 But more recently, judges and lawyers have complained that, in
practice, bellwether trials limit or distort critical information needed to
globally resolve cases.89 Because of the substantial cost and risk associated
with big cases, parties rarely conduct more than a handful of trials, often with
mixed results. Moreover, bellwether trials often lead to practically binding
global settlements without meaningful participation from plaintiffs.90 Rather
than settle in the shadow of law, the turn to bellwether settlements echoes
calls by court observers to develop more transparent procedures for the large
number of cases that, more often, settle in the shadow of settlement.91
1. The Promise and Perils of Bellwether Trials
The same forces that once pushed lawyers and judges to embrace
bellwether trials—the push for more information, participation, and accuracy
when resolving many common cases—are now pushing lawyers to look for
88. See Fallon et al., supra note 3, at 2332 (describing the “modern informational
approach” to bellwether trials).
89. See Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 161–62 (“[A]t most, [bellwether trials would] have
brought about settlements in individual claims or small clusters of claims. [But] [t]he parties
would not have had sufficient information to effect a wholesale global settlement.”).
90. See Burch, supra note 7; Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent
Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 279–92 (2011).
91. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1713 (2012).

2017]

THE BELLWETHER SETTLEMENT

2289

other solutions, like bellwether mediation. In the 1990s, some courts turned
to “trials by statistics” to avoid time-consuming and redundant litigation.92
The idea was that a court could try a sample of representative cases and then
extrapolate the results to a broader group of claims.93 In so doing, they hoped
to avoid the duplicative expenditure of time and money associated with
traditional case-by-case adjudication,94 which itself threatened access to
courts.95
However, statistical trials raised new concerns. First, courts resisted
proceedings that traded individualized evidence of harm for “new-fangled
proof of aggregated and averaged injur[ies].”96 Second, courts worried about
denying defendants and many absent plaintiffs their own “day in court.”97
Third, courts and commentators fretted over the risk and consequences of
error.98 How should parties identify the most representative plaintiffs? What
is the right sample size? What process would ensure plaintiffs’ lawyers
conducting the trials had the right incentives and experience to represent a
large group of people?
These concerns gave rise to the bellwether trial. A court would still try a
small number of cases that approximated the larger universe of cases. But
the results would not bind anyone. The hope was that trials would generate
enough information about the remaining claims—their strengths,
weaknesses, and value—to help individually represented parties forge a
larger settlement.99 The bellwether trial helped accommodate many of the

92. See In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997) (approving the
concept of sampling, but finding that the chosen plan was defective due to the failure to use a
random sample); In re Estate of E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1462 (D.
Haw. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996). But see
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev’d in part, 151
F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
93. See Jay Tidmarsh, Resurrecting Trials by Statistics, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1459, 1464
(2015); see also Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized
Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 841–
51 (1992).
94. See In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838,
859 (6th Cir. 2013); 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:9, at 27 (5th
ed. 2011) (“Class actions are particularly efficient when . . . the courts are flooded with
repetitive claims involving common issues.”).
95. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986) (granting
certification of a class action involving asbestos).
96. Tidmarsh, supra note 93, at 1464; see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93
(2008) (observing the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day
in court” (quoting Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996))).
97. Fallon et al., supra note 3, at 2331–32 (criticizing binding bellwether trials).
98. See Tidmarsh, supra note 93, at 1471 (noting that difficulties include “defining
homogenous groups or subgroups to sample, selecting a proper sample size, ensuring adequate
investment incentives for the plaintiffs who participate in the exemplary trials, and choosing
unbiased factfinders”).
99. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 610–
12 (2012) (describing cases in which bellwether plaintiffs were used to forge an aggregate
settlement); Sherman, supra note 14, at 697 (stating bellwether trials “offer an accurate picture
of how different juries would view different cases across the spectrum of weak and strong
cases that are aggregated”).
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concerns raised by statistical sampling, while promising meaningful and
quick relief.
Today, bellwether trials are everywhere. In 2004, the Manual for Complex
Litigation, which provides the influential guidance for federal courts
confronting big cases, endorsed bellwether trials as a meaningful substitute
in place of trial by statistics.100 Outside of federal courts, administrative and
Article I courts have also adopted bellwether trials to resolve mass tort cases,
such as vaccine-related injuries.101
Nevertheless, bellwether trials have not completely lived up to their
promise. First, many bellwethers never sound a bell. The cases that parties
select as bellwethers often end up settling on the eve of trial. Consider the
September 11 first responder litigation. After the federal district court
charged with overseeing the litigation instructed the parties to organize a
series of bellwether trials for workers suffering respiratory injuries, all of the
cases settled.102
Second, bellwethers may actually distort, rather than clarify, a defendant’s
liability. Statistical sampling, when properly applied, should smooth out
differences between cases over time.103 By contrast, parties rarely have an
incentive to complete all bellwether trials, which are expensive and risky to
try. Therefore, when cases go to trial, they often produce a small number of
wildly disparate outcomes.104 In some cases, outlying verdicts entrench
parties even further, causing negotiations to break down and prolonging a
final resolution.105 In the current General Motors litigation, for example,
disparate verdicts have yielded little to no information for the general run of

100. The third edition of the Manual, produced in 1995, supported trials-by-statistics plan.
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 33.28 (FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 1995). By the
next edition in 2004, the Manual had retreated. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 21.5 (FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 2004) (noting only that a trial-by-statistics plan was “not
accepted as mainstream”).
101. See Snyder ex rel. Snyder v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 01-162V,
2009 WL 332044, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 12, 2009) (“[B]y the agreement of the parties, the
evidence adduced in the . . . proceeding is applied to other cases, along with any additional
evidence adduced in those particular cases. The parties are . . . not bound by the results in the
test case, only agreeing that the expert opinions and evidence forming the basis for those
opinions could be considered in additional cases presenting the same theory of causation.”);
Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2827187 [https://
perma.cc/NMJ6-PV4B].
102. See Benjamin Weiser, Judge in 9/11 Suits Feels No Regret That None Ever Went to
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2016, at A15.
103. See Edward K. Cheng, When 10 Trials Are Better Than 1000: An Evidentiary
Perspective on Trial Sampling, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 957 (2012); Saks & Blanck, supra
note 93, at 835 (“By awarding that same amount to each of the remaining . . . plaintiffs, the
court also does better, in terms of accuracy of award, than it would if it
conducted . . . individualized trials.”).
104. See Hellerstein, supra note 16, 161–63.
105. See Martinotti, supra note 16, at 575 (“[I]f the parties and counsel are in the midst of
successful settlement discussions, a bellwether trial that results in a verdict outside the range
of settlement—i.e., an outlier—may empower a party to go forth with the litigation and cause
negotiations to break down.”).
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claims, while at the same time aggravating relationships between lead
counsel on each side.106
Third, bellwether trials do not encourage plaintiffs to meaningfully
participate in trial or a final settlement. In some cases, the global settlement
may not fully reflect the interests and desires of individual clients. When
parties in the national Vioxx litigation reached a global settlement following
several bellwether trials, some believed the final settlement simply reflected
the extraordinary pressure that plaintiffs’ attorneys exerted over their clients
to take the final settlement.107
This is not to say that bellwether trials lack value. Such trials are useful,
even if they do not always live up to their promise. Bellwether trials evolved
to provide more fitting information, with greater accuracy and more
meaningful participation than high-stakes trials by statistics. Bellwether
trials also continue to serve a valuable purpose by creating a deliberative,
democratic process to determine parties’ rights and responsibilities—not to
mention practical leverage to get parties to the bargaining table. But like
statistical trials, they also struggle to increase representative outcomes,
promote input, and curb strategic behavior between and among counsel.
In many cases, the process by which parties approach bellwether trials
plays a more important role in the final outcome. As courts help oversee the
creation of steering committees, appoint special masters and magistrate
judges to broker disputes, and introduce Lone Pine orders and “core
discovery databases,” parties have learned how to craft a private bureaucracy
to globally resolve their dispute.108 One could say that it is the bureaucratic
structure judges create—the way courts remake individual “cases” into an
organized “litigation”109—that really determines litigation outcomes. Across
civil, administrative, and criminal law, such institutional arrangements often
define the “going rates” used to resolve large groups of similar cases.110
The Stryker litigation attempted to adjust to this unstated, but wellaccepted feature of bellwether trials: they rarely provide much of a
106. See Cara Salvatore, Trial-Light GM Bellwethers Bear Fruit for Ignition MDL Deal,
LAW360 (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.law360.com/newyork/articles/836591/trial-light-gmbellwethers-bear-fruit-for-ignition-mdl-deal [https://perma.cc/8P8X-JX8V].
107. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 90, at 279–92.
108. In the September 11 litigation, for example, Judge Hellerstein appointed special
masters to code detailed information about 11,000 claims in a searchable computer database.
Information gleaned from the database allowed the parties to select “test cases” to understand
how one case resolution would impact other similar cases. “By adding or subtracting from the
criteria reflected in the various fields,” according to the court, one could then identify the
factors “strongly correlated with the severity of injury and which factors had a lesser impact,
or no impact at all.” Alvin K. Hellerstein et al., The 9/11 Litigation Database: A Recipe for
Judicial Management, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 653, 658 (2013).
109. See Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5
(1991).
110. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2482 n.78 (2004) (arguing that arm’s-length plea bargaining is “tempered by stable
going rates for ordinary crimes.”); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO.
J.L. ETHICS 1485, 1535 (2009) (describing “going rates” for mine-run personal injury claims
where settlement values are assessed in ways divorced from the underlying claims’ substantive
merit).
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bellwether or a trial. Rather, in Stryker, the value the court provided was the
creation of an institutional structure for settlement.
2. From Bellwether Trials to Bellwether Settlements
A court’s complete embrace of a bellwether settlement scheme raises
interesting questions for juries: What do bellwethers settlements mean when
the procedures and outcomes lack any connection to the decisions a jury
might reach?
Most proponents of bellwether trials often assume some role for a jury in
resolving a complex dispute. First, bellwether trials provide a “dress
rehearsal” for other jury trials likely to come in a large case by helping parties
hone their evidence and their arguments. Second, a bellwether jury verdict
assures that any eventual settlement bears some relationship to the merits of
the dispute. Third, the prospect of a jury trial in complex litigation wards off
the threat of collusion and assures that the plaintiffs’ counsel have sufficient
bargaining strength in settlement negotiations. Fourth, a bellwether jury
serves an important democratic function with deep roots in the history of
American adjudication.
By dispensing with the jury entirely, bellwether settlements risk these
important benefits—but such settlements do offer some advantages. First,
bellwether trials do not necessarily help counsel learn how random
beneficiaries of a global settlement will value their claims. The bellwether
mediations, however, give the parties concrete information about how
different plaintiffs, with different injuries, will likely respond to a grand
bargain struck between a manufacturer and the plaintiffs. In Stryker, the
mediation process forced lawyers, who sometimes only see the big picture in
settlement, to “understand who their clients were in the mediation.”111 As a
result, the final settlement accommodated different plaintiffs by
incorporating “enhancements” grounded in the actual experiences of
plaintiffs with double hip replacements, infections, open wounds, and other
complications.112
Second, bellwether settlements also avoid the problem of outlier or
clustering verdicts. The comparative expense of bellwether mediations
means the parties could conduct a lot more of them. Moreover, the parties
could ground their global settlement talks on the more targeted, narrow band
of going rates for settlement exchanged between many of the lawyers. When
the endgame is a global settlement, a focused sampling of arm’s-length
negotiations may help counsel better identify solutions from the ground up.
Finally, as discussed in more detail below, the bellwether settlement
process relied on iteration and mediation to build trust necessary to share
important information and include diverse groups of law firms in the process.

111. Telephone Interview with Ellen Relkin, supra note 34.
112. See supra notes 69, 71–72 and accompanying text.
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B. The Benefits of Supervised Repeat Play
A bellwether settlement process also highlights the value of carefully
supervised repeat play in the resolution of large numbers of common cases.
Negotiation theory has long suggested that parties tend to share more
information and improve welfare when mediated settlements take place
incrementally and repeatedly.113 The success of a bellwether settlement
process embraces this idea.
In conflict research, commentators have long distinguished between
negotiators who cooperate to “create value” and those who compete to “claim
value.”114 Negotiators who create value work primarily to expand the pie,
producing “win-win” solutions where both parties benefit.115 To do so, they
identify common interests and communicate information clearly.
Negotiators who claim value, by contrast, compete to claim the largest share
of the goods in dispute. To be successful, they must bargain tough and horsetrade. They may start negotiating high, concede slowly, exaggerate the value
of any concessions, and conceal information while arguing “forcefully on
behalf of principles that imply favorable settlements.”116
David Lax and James Sebenius famously posited that claiming and
creating value are not inconsistent strategies.117 They are inextricably linked.
At some point in any negotiation, most negotiators alternatively try to
“expand the pie” or “claim their share.” But that practice presents all
negotiators with a kind of prisoner’s dilemma. If both parties cooperate, they
will both have good outcomes; but if one cooperates while the other
competes, the cooperative party will get rolled over by the more competitive
party. Even though both parties are better off if they both cooperate, in the
face of uncertainty, each side’s best choice is to compete as early in the
negotiation as possible.
These problems aggravate the agency problems that already exist in
litigation. How do clients know that lawyers’ decisions to share information
collaboratively, or to adopt a principled position, reflect what they want?
Professional rules typically entrust these strategic negotiation decisions to
lawyers,118 but these problems are compounded in settlements that involve
113. See generally D. Lax & J. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator: The Negotiator’s
Dilemma: Creating and Claiming Value, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION 51 (Stephen B. Goldberg
et al. eds., 3d ed. 1999).
114. See generally id.; ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 11–43 (2000); RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B.
MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL
INTERACTION SYSTEM (2d ed. 1991).
115. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991); MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 114, at ix; Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 768–71 (1984).
116. Lax & Sebenius, supra note 113, at 53.
117. See id.
118. See James J. Alfini, Settlement Ethics and Lawyering in ADR Proceedings: A
Proposal to Revise Rule 4.1, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255, 256 (1999) (observing that the
profession has “not created the necessary ethics infrastructure to support this settlement
culture”); Russell Engler, Out of Sight and out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’
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large groups of people, who not only have different claims but different
interests in the settlement process and outcome.119 Elderly clients in Stryker,
for example, did not have as much time to live as younger clients. Were
lawyers to push for a trial on behalf of those clients, or adopt other hard lines
in negotiation, they also may risk denying them justice entirely during their
lifetime. Younger clients, by contrast, may have a different interest in the
timing and value of a final resolution.
Conflict theorists believe the solution to these problems involve either
mediation or iteration.120 First, mediation can help the parties adopt more
collaborative negotiation strategies by relying on a mediator to police the
ways the parties share information. Sometimes, as was the case in Stryker,
mediators will conduct shuttle diplomacy, separating the parties, forcing
them to identify mutual interests, and managing the flow of information.
Second, breaking down the negotiation into small repeat bargains can
foster trust and limit gamesmanship. Models of the prisoner’s dilemma have
found that parties are less willing to adopt competitive positions when they
know they will see each other again.121 This is because repeat interactions
permit parties to punish or create new opportunities for cooperation in the
next. Iteration performs a similar function in negotiations. Likewise,
negotiators “cooperate when they know that their current actions can affect
future payoffs, when they believe that a defection now will lead to sufficient
defection by their opponent to make the initial move undesirable.”122
Accordingly, commentators recommend breaking negotiations down into
stages and forcing parties to deal with each other again and again over time.
“[W]hen the negotiation is in fact one of many similar repeated encounters,
the negotiators may be able to mitigate” competitive behavior.123
Bellwether mediations rely on both techniques. The parties and mediators
both emphasized their willingness to share information, in part, because of
the trust they established over the course of the several smaller scale
mediations, with lower stakes than a bellwether trial. The process also built
trust among different plaintiffs’ law firms, who in a one-shot deal, might have
had little input or control over the process. As the lead counsel for the
plaintiffs observed:
Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 79, 79 (1997) (“[T]he
ethical rules governing lawyers, as well as most ethics textbooks, fail to address such
negotiations in any specific way.”); Barry R. Temkin, Misrepresentation by Omission in
Settlement Negotiations: Should There Be a Silent Safe Harbor? 18 GEO. J.L. ETHICS 179,
182 (2004) (“Settlement negotiations are, in many respects, the ethical no-man’s land of legal
practice.”).
119. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the
Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1188 (1995) (explaining that existing ethics
rules do not contemplate the type of attorney-client relationships that exist in the settlement of
mass torts).
120. See Sander & Rozdeiczer, supra note 25, at 28 n.b (“One solution to this dilemma is
for the parties to make partial reciprocal disclosures over time. Another solution would be to
involve a third party neutral to facilitate the exchange of information.”).
121. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
122. Lax & Sebenius, supra note 113, at 58.
123. Id. at 60.
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Probably even more important, we were able to gain a level of trust and
comfort with the defendant that you ordinarily did not get when you are
sitting down at the table to negotiate a global settlement that is as large and
complex as this one.
This is not to say that this process was easy, we fought over every term,
literally, over the course of the negotiations to reach today’s result. There
were times when we didn’t think it was going to happen, but it did. We’re
here.124

Repeat play also has problems. Unlike people who rarely go to court,
repeat lawyers and litigators can “play for the rules,” working to establish
positive legal precedent or settlement outcomes for future cases.125 These
problems are aggravated by limited court oversight over settlements.126 If
anything, one might say large complex litigation is plagued by too many cozy
relationships between plaintiffs and defense counsel. Elizabeth Burch has,
for example, found that the same law firms often repeatedly appear as lead
counsel in multidistrict litigation, creating new conflicts of interests between
those attorneys and their clients.127 In an effort to gain trust with opposing
counsel they likely will see again, attorneys, Burch fears, will go too easy on
each other, accede to coercive settlement terms, or accept poorly divided
settlement proceeds in exchange for high fee awards.128 She accordingly
recommends solutions designed to promote greater diversity, transparency,
and oversight in multidistrict litigation assignments.129
Bellwether settlements cannot respond to all of these problems. They
cannot correct for repeat play across different litigations nor can they assure
that defendants will not select cases to mediate based on the skill of the law
firm involved. When carefully supervised and regulated, however, courts can
reduce these concerns, while exploiting some of the benefits of repeat play.
For example, a court’s blind assignment of plaintiffs and law firms to appear
in mediation may improve arm’s-length bargaining and reduce groupthink.
Moreover, a mediation process that includes many different law firms, whose
negotiated settlements will inform a global settlement, may allow parties to
benefit from a diversity of viewpoints, while building necessary trust to
identify common interests.
Finally, when representative plaintiffs
themselves appear in individual mediation—and stand to benefit from the

124. Transcript of Global Settlement Program Hearing, supra note 2, at 18.
125. See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1994).
126. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1078–82 (1984); Richard
C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1058 (2000); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going
Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
151, 208 (2000).
127. See Burch, supra note 7; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat
Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2724637 [https://perma.cc/
Q96D-HYFB].
128. See generally Burch, supra note 7.
129. Id. at 135–54.
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individual outcome—they may check a lawyer who is more focused on his
or her next payday.
C. Judge’s Information-Forcing Role
These trends suggest that, even as bellwether settlements challenge the
traditional judicial role, courts can remain critical players in ensuring the
integrity of judicial proceedings increasingly dominated by settlement.
Bellwether settlements arguably form part of a larger trend taking place in
the American courthouse. As public courts export more cases to private
dispute resolution (like mandatory arbitration), they have imported tools from
alternative dispute resolution to creatively resolve problems. Increasingly,
courts use annexed arbitration, special settlement masters, and “problem
solving” courts.130 The result may offer solutions that promise more open
and quick legal access than traditional jury trials. The challenge, however, is
to determine what role our courts should play when large cases push them to
move outside their traditional public role as adjudicators.
Under one line of thought, the “classical” model, judges facilitate
settlement through public, case-by-case reasoning.131 That is, people
ordinarily resolve disputes on their own, but when they cannot, courts
provide a neutral place to resolve their problems.132 Courts can determine
the parties’ right to a legal remedy by relying on the arguments the parties
make and the evidence they introduce.133 Future disputants may then use
precedent set in that earlier case to solve similar problems, often by reaching
individual settlements negotiated in “the shadow of the law.”134
As illustrated above, however, many cases do not settle that way. When
parties schedule bellwether trials, litigants must settle large numbers of civil
cases with little individualized input and according to norms that bear weak
resemblance to any substantive law. Such trends are not limited to complex
litigation. In personal injury and automobile insurance litigation, for
example, plaintiff and defense lawyers rely on routine settlement practices in
130. See Judith Resnick, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2807 (2015) (describing
policies that “press trial-level judges to become conciliators, to deploy other individuals as
‘neutrals’ to mediate or to arbitrate in courts, and to outsource decision making to the private
market”).
131. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1285 (1976) (famously noting that, historically, “courts could be seen as an adjunct to
private ordering, whose primary function was the resolution of disputes about the fair
implications of individual interactions”).
132. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823, 824–25 (1985) (identifying and questioning American reliance on neutral judicial
decision making).
133. See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE
38 (1984); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 383
(1978).
134. Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225 (1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950,
968 (1979).
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individual cases—sometimes using obscure settlement formulas to resolve
claims brought by similarly situated victims.135 Even as the American
litigation system promises everyone a “day in court,”136 outcomes in civil
disputes often turn on how unfamiliar organizations of lawyers and
businesses lump together large groups of cases on a spreadsheet.137
These issues are a real problem for an American-style litigation system,
which, for better or worse, heavily relies on courts to deter bad conduct and
compensate for losses.138 As Stephen Yeazell observes, lawyers often price
settlements “in the dark—engaging in transactions for civil claims in a state
of ignorance we think intolerable in other similarly important markets.”139
For that reason, Yeazell calls for the creation of a system, modeled on other
forms of market regulation, to track civil settlements.140 Public databases
would code “various factors that might reduce or increase the settlement
value of the claim,”141 including information about the plaintiff’s “medical
history, age, and prior claims,” as well as “data about the accident alleged to
have produced these injuries.”142
Increasingly, judges are taking on that very role in complex litigation—
engaging in what commentators (including myself) have called “information
forcing” or “facilitative judging.”143 Early in litigation, courts devote
increasing resources to help parties manage the flow of information necessary
to resolve a wide variety of cases. For example, much like Judge Martinotti,
Judge Eduardo Robreno successfully resolved over 180,000 asbestos claims
several years ago.144 He did so by helping committees of lawyers identify
135. See Jaros & Zimmerman, supra note 18; Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman,
The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 VA. L. REV. 129 (2015); see also H. LAURENCE ROSS,
SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 22 (2d ed.
1980) (surveying the business of insurance adjustment for automobile accidents, and
describing it as “individualistic mainly in theory; in practice, it is categorical and mechanical,
as any system must be if it is to handle masses of cases in an efficient manner”); Nora Freeman
Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 824–45 (2011).
136. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008) (describing the day-in-court ideal in
American law); Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due
Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1881 (2009) (describing the “presumption that each person has a
right to her day in court.”).
137. See Samuel Issacharoff & John F. Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1575–76 (2004);
Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043,
1071 (2013); Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 135.
138. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 377
(2007) (observing that the “basic regulatory model” of the United States “is ex post rather than
ex ante, a form of regulation that draws heavily on its common-law tradition.”).
139. Yeazell, supra note 20, at 143–44.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 154.
142. Id.
143. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 18; Jaime Dodge, Facilitative Judging: Organizational
Design in Mass-Multidistrict Litigation, 64 EMORY L.J. 329, 351 (2014); Jaros & Zimmerman,
supra note 18.
144. See generally Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liablity [sic]
Multidistrict Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97
(2013).
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ways to sort large numbers of claims very early in the process.145 Judge
Alvin Hellerstein similarly helped parties create a “core discovery database,”
requiring counsel to produce and code medical histories thousands of
September 11 workers; in doing so, he helped the parties systematically
identify over two hundred different types of injuries, which aided their
pursuit of a historic global settlement.146
Viewed in this light, Judge Martinotti’s bellwether mediations carve out a
similar role for judges to help parties overcome problems in a relatively
unregulated settlement market. Bellwether settlements, when carefully
supervised by a court, can encourage parties to establish fair settlement
values, exchange information about them, and, in the process, build trust
necessary to forge a much larger global settlement. Such targeted
interventions can be a vital part of the judicial role in promoting information,
participation, and distributive justice.

145. See id.
146. Hellerstein et al., supra note 108, at 654.

